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1972 PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT RULES
OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT:
RELIEVING THE UNCERTAINTIES OF
MARGINAL ATTORNEY CRIMES

I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically the legal profession has as jealously as possible arrogated solely to itself the responsibility for lawyer
discipline. Until recent years, I suggest to you that the
performance of the profession in managing that responsibility has been a much ignored disgrace.'
It is in light of such deserved chastisement and the extreme
level of public disrespect for the bar that this comment will examine Pennsylvania's new efforts in the field of attorney discipline.
The present situation is indicative of the need for a brighter era
of deserved respect for the profession and its members. The allegations of attorney crimes, brought to the forefront during the
"Watergate Era" and magnified with the resignation of former Vice
President Agnew and former President Nixon, have drawn "significant response" 2 from the lay public as well as from concerned
attorneys throughout the United States. Bar associations have also
exhibited great concern about attorney crimes in recent years.
Some states, like Pennsylvania, had already responded to this
problem without the impetus of Watergate, and the hope is that
all states will now recognize the need for strengthening and expanding disciplinary procedures. "Watergate may well prove to be
a watershed for reform and improvement in professional discipline."3
1. Address by former American Bar Association President Chesterfield Smith, Regional Conference of Personnel Concerned with Bar Discipline Sponsored by the A.B.A. Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, January 16, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Address by Chesterfield
Smith].
2. Telephone interview with F. LaMar Forshee, Director of the National Center for Professional Discipline, in Chicago, Illinois, January 29,
1974 [hereinafter cited as Interview with F. LaMar Forsheej.
3. The former President of the American Bar Association voiced several opinions on the need for tighter discipline within the profession, and
speaking at the first regional conference sponsored by the A.B.A. Standing
Committee on Professional Discipline he lauded the steps already taken by
the profession against the attorneys involved in specific Watergate activities.
As examples of actions the profession has already taken, I call the

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

The specific problems arising out of Watergate are not within
the scope of this Comment, however, and they are presented merely
to indicate the need for reform and to reflect the era of which such
reform will be a product. The thrust of this Comment is to analyze
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement 4 as they relate to crimes committed by attorneys while acting
in their professional or nonprofessional capacity. Excluded entirely
will be the areas of malpractice and judicial discipline. Initially
this Comment will examine the disciplinary rules as they relate
to the private action of an individual apart from the action of bar
associations and the independent role of bar associations. The primary focus will be upon the increased effectiveness of discipline
under the rules and a comparison with California's moral turpitude
standard. As will become evident, the main problems arise in considering marginal crimes where the question of initiation of discipline to be imposed is left for ad hoc consideration. An analysis
of evasion of federal income tax will specifically highlight the effectiveness of Pennsylvania's rules.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
The role of private action is to initiate the criminal charge on
following to your attention: The New York Court of Appeals has
already disbarred G. Gordon Liddy, a former New York lawyer, because of his conviction on a felony charge resulting from Watergate.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has suspended John W.
Dean II from practice pending further order of the Court because
of his conviction on criminal charges resulting from Watergate.
The State Bar of California has publicly announced that it has
opened disciplinary investigation files on six attorneys-Richard M.
Nixon, John D. Ehrlichman, Donald H. Segretti, Herbert M. Kalmbach, Gordon G. Strachan and Robert Mardian-because of their alleged involvement in Watergate. The State Bar of Washington for
similar reasons has started investigations of John D. Ehrlichman
and Egil Krogh. The Special three-judge panel in Maryland has
unanimously recommended to the Court of Appeals of Marylandthat state's highest court-that Spiro T. Agnew be disbarred-a
position strongly recommended by the State 'Bar Association of
Maryland.
Address by Chesterfield Smith.
James D. Fellers, current President of the A.B.A. stated recently that
the events of Watergate gave the legal profession a new perspective and left
lawyers with a greater sense of public and professional responsibility. Fellers believes that the legal profession's public image remains sound, in that
the events of Watergate "have signalled the death knell of haphazard or infrequent disciplinary procedures," and because "a very large percentage of
bar associations are hiring full time staff counsel to examine grievances
brought to the attention of the state and local bar associations." News release from the American Bar Association, Division of Communications,
March 11, 1975.
4. PA. SuP. CT. R. 17-1 to 17-25 (effective March 21, 1972).

which the professional discipline is based. Whereas in malpractice
cases the individual alleges negligence against the attorney personally in a civil action, disciplinary action directed against criminal
activity is initiated through a professional disciplinary authority.
It is therefore the duty of an individual dissatisfied with professional legal services, where criminal activity is suspected, to bring
criminal charges or to report that dissatisfaction to the proper disciplinary agency. The various state jurisdictions presently operate
under different systems because there is no national authority for
discipline. The national, state, and local bar associations have
figured heavily in the formulation of The Disciplinary Board of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania authorized by Pennsylvania's
rules,5 and it is essential to put the board in proper perspective
in order to clearly understand the overall disciplinary system in
Pennsylvania.
The primary function of the American Bar Association6 in the
area of attorney discipline is to promulgate a code of ethics and
rules of discipline and to offer formal and informal opinions on
given factual considerations. Effective January 1, 1970, the Code
of Professional Responsibility 7 replaced the former Canons of Professional Ethics. The code is generally adopted by statutes or by
rules of court into the disciplinary system of a state. Pennsylvania
originally incorporated the code intact, but subsequently reserved
the right to rule on future amendments to the code. 8
Along with reforming the code during the years preceding 1970,
the A.B.A. created a special committee" to make a general inquiry
into disciplinary enforcement throughout the United States. The
Clark committee noted generally that the local and fragmented nature of the disciplinary structure created a problem for effective
discipline, and that "[a] decentralized structure, utilizing a multiplicity of disciplinary agencies and courts, also produces a substantial lack of uniformity in discipline imposed, which is aggravated
by [the] absence of intrastate coordination."' 10 The committee's
simple recommendation to meet this challenge was to achieve centralization within each state by placing disciplinary jurisdiction under the ultimate control of the highest court in the state." The
5.
6.
7.
(1971).
8.
P. 205.
9.
mitteee

PA.SuP. CT.R. 17-5.
Hereinafter cited as A.B.A.
Preface to ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY at p. i
PA. SUP. CT.R. 17-3 was the original authority, but see PA. R. Civ.
Chaired by retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, the comproduced the results of this study in the form of ABA SPECIAL COM-

MITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS AND REC-

oInVIENDATIONS IN DIscIPLInARY ENFORCEMENT
[hereinafter cited as CLARK COMMITTEE].
10. Id., Problem 2, at 25-6.
11. Id. at 26.

(Final Draft, June 1970)
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committee also recognized other specific problems in existing disciplinary procedures;12 these problems and the committee's suggested
solutions will be considered in the course of the Comment in reference to Pennsylvania's efforts to eliminate the ambiguity surrounding discipline for marginal attorney crimes. 13
Pennsylvania is one of twenty-one states with non-integrated
bar associations. 14 In a jurisdiction such as Pennsylvania, attorneys
are not obligated to belong to the state bar association, thereby
placing most of the organized authority over individual attorneys
in local county bar associations. Prior to the 1972 rules the only
real function served by the Pennsylvania Bar Association15 in the
area of discipline was to urge county bar assocations to act in specific cases or to act initially for good cause.16 The P.B.A. could
not initiate disciplinary action, but a board of governance had been
created by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to investigate complaints and make recommendations to that court once7 the complaints had been forwarded from county bar associations.'
In response to the Clark committee report the board of governance created the Special Committee on Disciplinary Procedures to
propose revisions in the then existent system of disciplinary enforcement. The pertinent defects and infirmities found in the
Pennsylvania system coincided with the problems outlined by the
Clark committee.'8 Acknowledging the weaknesses in the former
system with respect to attorney crimes, the board of governance
concluded that there were "no adequate procedures for prompt
12. The specific problems recognized related to discipline where criminal charges were pending. Id., Problem 13, at 82; acceptance of resignations. Id., Problem 18, at 101; suspension pending final appeal. Id., Problem 22, at 122; and preferential treatment of attorneys charged with criminal acts. Id., Problem 34, at 179.
13. See §§ IIC, IIIA, IIIB and IV infra.
14. Interview with Paul S. Roeder, Director, Committee, Section and
Local Bar Services of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, January 28, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Interview with Paul
S. Roeder].
15. Hereinafter cited as P.B.A.
16. Interview with Paul S. Roeder.
17. Id.
18. Inherent in the nature of a non-integrated bar was the finding that
overlapping jurisdiction had led to conflicting procedures and inconsistent
imposition of disciplinary measures. The lack of adequate financing and
the inherent reluctance of members of local agencies to initiate proceedings
against close associates both reflect the need for centralization of disciplinary authority. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNANCE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR, at 30 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as BOARD OF GOVERNANCE: REPORT]. See note 10 and
accompanying text supra.

disciplinary action against attorneys convicted of serious crimes reflecting upon their fitness to practice law."' 9
The revisions proposed by the Board of Governance of the
Pennsylvania Bar incorporated most of the recommendations of the
Clark committee, including the creation of a central agency to be
known as the Disciplinary Board of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. The board was subsequently created by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court 20 and given exclusive jurisdiction over any attorney
admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and any attorney specially admitted for a particular proceeding.2 1 With the creation of the board
any function performed by the P.B.A. in the area of attorney discipline was turned over to that agency for complete centralized control.22 The procedure for disciplinary enforcement in Pennsylvania

has thus evolved to the point that all disciplinary action is initiated
by or through the board. In achieving this degree of centralization, the legal profession of Pennsylvania has succeeded in becoming completely self-regulated. 23 In achieving this goal of effective
self-regulation The Special Committee of the Board of Governance
of the Pennsylvania Bar was justifiably proud after submitting
their proposals to the court:
Pennsylvania is, so far as we are aware, the first state to
consider a complete revision of its disciplinary structure
following the dissemination of the recommendations of the
Clark Committee and, therefore, implementation of these
19.
20.

BOARD OF GOVERNANCE
PA. SuP. CT. R. 17-5.

REPORT,

at 30 (1971).

21. Id. at 17-1.
22. The P.B.A. still has a Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility which renders advisory opinions upon request. Interview
with Paul S. Roeder.

The powers and procedures of the board are clearly outlined in the

rules and are much broader in scope than the coverage of this Comment.
Specifically, the board has full power to investigate upon complaint or on
its own motion, to appoint hearing committees and review their findings,
to privately reprimand attorneys, and to submit final recommendations for
disciplinary action to the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
PA. SuP. CT. R. 17-5 (powers of the board); id. 17-6 (powers of hearing committees); id. 17-7 (powers of disciplinary counsel); id. 1108 (general procedure). See also Rules and Procedures of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, codified by the Legislative Reference Bureau
in 3 PA. B. 2683-2704.
23. Disciplinary counsel serving the board are employed full-time and
are precluded from private practice by PA. SUP. CT. R. 17-7. In addition,
the board's operation is financed solely through assessment of attorneys admitted to practice in Pennsylvania. Id. 17-19. The constitutionality of this
provision and related procedures was considered and upheld in Canter v.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 353 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1973). This
assessment was instituted in order to avoid entanglements with politics generally and the legislative and executive branches of state government specifically. Interview with Allen B. Zerfoss, Chief Disciplinary Counsel of
The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, January 28, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Interview with
Allen B. Zerfoss].
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proposed rules would proclaim Pennsylvania's
leadership
24
in the field of disciplinary reform.
III.

PENNSLYVANIA SUPREME COURT RuLEs OF

DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT

Prior to the adoption of the rules in 1972, the inefficiency of
the system for disciplinary enforcement outlined above was
equalled, and perhaps partly accounted for, by the ambiguity of
the statutory provisions for discipline.2 The vagueness of the statutes forced the courts to determine for themselves the specific acts
which warranted disciplinary action. 26 The rules have added a
much needed degree of clarity in the field of attorney discipline.
The early case law in Pennsylvania grew primarily from contempt situations, but these judicial considerations developed cri24. BOARD OF GOVERNANCE REPORT, at 5. Pennsylvania is, in fact, being
considered as a pilot state by many jurisdictions throughout the country,
and copies of Pennsylvania's rules have been distributed through the P.B.A.
and the board for their consideration. Interview with Gilbert Nurick,
Chairman of The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, February 27, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Interview
with Gilbert Nurick]. To date at least Alaska and Massachusetts have
adopted modified versions of the Pennsylvania rules. The rules of disciplinary enforcement and the rules of the disciplinary board are actively being studied by Hawaii, Kansas, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Texas, Washington and the Virgin Islands. Interview with Allen B. Zerfoss, Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, March 7, 1975.
25. The statutory sanctions, holdovers from as early as 1834, provided
that an attorney who should "misbehave himself in his office of attorney"
would be liable to "suspension, removal from office, or to such other penalties as have hitherto been allowed in such cases by the laws of this Commonwealth." The only specific act proscribed by statute was the retention
of a client's funds after demand, and the accompanying penalty was automatic disbarment, Act of April 14, 1834, P.L. 333, §§ 73-74 (1834) (suspended
1972). Subsequent procedural aspects and refinements of the system for
disciplinary enforcement were added, with the latest statutory addition enacted in 1931. Act of May 19, 1879, P.L. 66, §§ 1-2 [1879] (suspended 1972)
(writ of error; payment of costs on appeal); Act of May 8, 1909, P.L. 475,
§ 2 [1909] (suspended 1972) (disbarment or suspension operative in other
courts); Act of June 4, 1919, P.L. 384, §§ 1-3 [1919] (suspended 1972) (subpoena power for investigations, testimony, findings); Act of June 12, 1931,
P.L. 543, § 1 [1931] (suspended 1972) (subpoena power in investigations).
With the adoption of the rules, this entire section of statutory provisions
was suspended. PA. SuP. CT. R. 17-24.
26. The rules of court in effect prior to 1972 were entirely devoted to
procedure and jurisdiction, leaving the grounds for discipline open for interpretation by the courts. G. BRAND, BAR AssocIATIoNs, ATTORNEYS AND
JUDGES:

ORGANIZATION, ETHcs, DIscIPLINE 554, 599 (1956).

The author col-

lects all statutes and rules of court pertinent to discipline for every state,
and then offers summaries of state disciplinary procedures and bar admission,

teria for jurisdiction and standards of the profession which are still
cited as established guidelines for Pennsylvania's courts. 27 By 1880,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had declared that the purpose for
the exercise of power over attorneys was not one for enforcing civil
remedies, 28 but "to protect the court and the public against an attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his profession. '29 In the
same year, the court proclaimed unquestionable jurisdiction in disbarment proceedings and outlined the constitutional requisites for
due process, declaring that on its own motion and without any formal complaint or petition the court could "strike the name of an
attorney from the roll in a proper case, provided he has had reasonable notice and been afforded an opportunity to be heard in his
own defense."30
The first indication of specific grounds for discipline in the area
of attorney crimes came through an 1883 pronouncement of the
United States Supreme Court in Ex Parte Wall.al The Court established a standard which has withstood attempted moderation over
the ensuing century and has emerged intact:
If regularly convicted of a felony, an attorney will be
struck off the roles as of course, whatever the felony may
be, because he is rendered infamous. If convicted of a misdemeanor which imports fraud or dishonesty, the same
course will be taken. He will also be struck off the roll for
gross malpractice or dishonesty in his profession,32 or for
conduct gravely affecting his professionalcharacter.
Pennsylvania has basically followed the dictates of Wall, but has
added refinements to meet specific needs. Courts have authorized
disciplinary action where the attorneys acts have tended to "defeat the due administration of justice,"3 3 or to display the lack of
27. An 1835 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case refers back to an Act
of Assembly from 1722 declaring that attorneys, if they misbehaved, would
be liable "to suffer such pains, penalties, and suspensions, as attorneys at
law in Great Britain are liable in such cases." In re Austin, 5 Rawle 191
(Pa. 1835). The court went on to adopt the statutory language enacted in
1834. rd. at 199-200. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
28. This proposition was later modified to apply to any concept of
punishment of the attorney, e.g., Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1883).
But see In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968), wherein cases are collected
which consider disbarment to be a punishment or penalty imposed on the
attorney.
29. In re Davies, 93 Pa. 116, 122 (1880).
30. Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. 220, 237 (1880).
31. 107 U.S. 265 (1883).
32. Id. at 273 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the use of the
felony-misdemeanor criterion, see § IB1 infra. The element of fraud is
still essential for misdemeanors under the moral turpitude standard in California. See § I11B2 infra. The question of dishonesty and the concern for
an attorney's fitness to practice law are both still important even under
Pennsylvania's rules because the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility
is used to establish grounds for discipline. See § IIIA infra.
33. Cooper v. People, 22 P. 800 (Col. 1889). This decision is cited for
authority vis-a-vis attorney disbarment in contempt situations in In re
Gross' Disbarment, 26 Berks 224, 227-28 (C.P. Berks Cty. 1934).
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"moral fitness" of one worthy of trust in his professional employment.84 Courts have also warned that disbarment "should be
firmly exercised, but with great caution" 85 and "only in a clear
case;" 38 that acquittal, which "merely enables them to escape the
penalties of the criminal law" does not foreclose initiation of disciplinary action against attorneys; 37 and that although all circumstances should be considered in a disciplinary proceeding,3 8 mercy
is not the prerogative of the supreme court once the lower court
has entertained all mitigating circumstances. 9 It was, indeed, in
a spirit of continuing refinement and reserve that the court uttered
in a formal reprimand, "We trust this case will be the last of its
kind which this Court will ever have to act upon." 40 It was, however, in the spirit of reality and reform that the court adopted the
rules of disciplinary enforcement twenty-three years later.
In order to clarify and highlight the strengths and weaknesses
of the disciplinary rules they will be compared throughout the text
to the recommendations of the Clark committee and the existing
procedure under California's moral turpitude standard. The Clark
committee report included a proposed rule providing for immediate
and automatic interim suspension of attorneys convicted of "serious
41
crimes" and defined this term by use of elements and examples.
This proposed rule was incorporated into the proposed revisions
submitted by the board of governance to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. The rule actually adopted by the court 42 does not
utilize the "serious crime" criterion per se, but substitutes the
standard of "a crime which is punishable by imprisonment for one
year or upward in this or any other jurisdiction excluding violations of the Motor Vehicle Code. '43 In addition, the rule allows
that "the Court may enter an order immediately suspending the
attorney"4 4 rather than requiring an immediate suspension as
recommended by the A.B.A. and the board of governance.
34.

In re Wolfe's Disbarment, 288 Pa. 331, 334, 135 A. 732, 733 (1927).

35. Wilhelm's Case, 269 Pa. 416, 422, 112 A. 560, 562 (1921), citing back
to Maginnis's Case, 269 Pa. 186, 197, 112 A. 555, 559 (1921) for authority.
See also Sherwood's Investigation, 259 Pa. 254, 259, 103 A. 42, 43 (1918).
36. Wilhelm's Case, 269 Pa. 416, 422, 112 A. 560, 562 (1921).
37. In re Margolis, 269 Pa. 206, 211-12, 112 A. 478, 480 (1921).
38. Lewis v. Board of Governance of Pennsylvania Bar, 300 Pa. 465,
150 A. 748 (1930).
39. In re Scouten, 186 Pa. 270, 40 A. 481 (1898).
40. In re Schofield, 362 Pa. 201, 222, 66 A.2d 675, 685 (1949).
41. See note 63 and accompanying text infra.
42.
43.

PA. SUP. CT. R. 17-14.
Id. 17-14(a).

44.

Id. (emphasis added).

595:

Under the Business and Professional Code of California, 45 the
criterion for disciplinary action where an attorney has been convicted of a crime is whether he is convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. 4 6 Upon conviction of such a
crime, there is an immediate suspension pending final action.4 7 The
significance of the California code is that the Clark committee referred to the existing procedure for disciplinary enforcement 4in8
California as a model, except for the moral turpitude standard.
In addition, because California continues to use that standard, the
case law of that state will provide a point of comparison for the
analysis of Pennsylvania's rules.
IV.

COMPARISON OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT-

PENNSYLVANIA VS. CALIFORNIA
A.

Grounds for Discipline

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court established, as grounds for
discipline, acts or omissions which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility of the A.B.A. as it is from time to time in effect in
Pennsylvania. 49 Any specific statutory sanctions against an attorney's criminal conduct must be considered in conjunction with the
broader provisions of the code. Disciplinary Rule 1-102 is the pertinent rule governing misconduct of an attorney:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.5"
Cases interpreting this rule tend to emphasize either of two
policy considerations: protection of the public, or protection of the
legal profession."' The former consideration concerns the attorney's fitness to practice law as a trusted advisor for his clients. The
latter consideration concerns the reflection of his acts on the courts
and the reputation of the profession. Both considerations are rele45. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6101, 6102, 6106 (West 1962).
46. Id. § 6101.
47. Id. § 6102.
48. CLARK COMMITTEE, Problem 22, at 126.
49. PA. SuP. CT. R. 17-3. But see note 8 and accompanying text supra.
50. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY, DRI-102 (1970).
51. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICs 42-43 (1965). The author also presents
a digest of representative court decisions specifying grounds for discipline
based on a further categorization of acts within the framework of these two
considerations. See Appendix B, p. 304.

596,
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vant where criminal acts are involved, but a further breakdown
will narrow the issue at hand. One commentator has catalogued
various offenses into four grounds for discipline: I. Professional
Misconduct Interfering with the Administration of Justice, II. Professional Misconduct Not Directly Interfering with the Administration of Justice, III. Non-Professional Misconduct, and IV. Other
Grounds.512 The type of marginal crimes which cause problems for
courts fall primarily within the category of nonprofessional misconduct. Regardless of the ultimate punishment imposed, the initial
question to consider is whether the nature of the offense does indeed reflect on an attorney's fitness in such a way as to warrant
suspension pending the final determination of the degree of discipline to be imposed. It is in determining the criteria for resolving
this issue that conflict abounds. 53
An argument has been made that the moral turpitude provision
in DRl-102 (A) (3) relating to non-professional misconduct should
be deleted because moral turpitude is a vague standard which has
been inconsistently interpreted. For this reason the degree of
moral turpitude is unsuitable as a standard of professional discipline "because it may apply to crimes that bear no apparent relationship to fitness for the practice of law."5 4 This particular argument against moral turpitude as a standard seems not to view the
inclusion of this element in the proper perspective. The moral
turpitude standard is essentially a residuary clause, included to protect public confidence in the legal profession against even minor violations of the law by an attorney. Such conduct, although the acts
themselves may not be particularly reprehensible, may tend to
show a disposition to violate the rules of society, and the inclusion
of a generally proscriptive rule is an attempt to avoid the problem
of the possible omission of a specific sanction. 55 That the inclusion
of such a blanket provision is justified does not necessarily mean
that the choice of the moral turpitude standard is a workable one.
If the phrase is useful in determining the attorney's fitness to practice law, then it succeeds in its primary purpose. It is submitted,
however, that the phrase is not satisfactory even though the intent
52. Comment, The Imposition of DisciplinaryMeasures for the Misconduct of Attorneys, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1039 (1952).
53. Compare, e.g., In re Alker, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 653 (O.C. Phila. Cty.
1959) aff'd per curiam 398 Pa. 188, 157 A.2d 749 (1960) with In re Hallinan,
43 Cal. 2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 (1954). See generally §§ fI-IV infra.
54. Comment, Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal
Profession,48 TExAs L. REv. 267 (1970).
55. Id. at 279-80.

is sound.5 6 The standard must be one relating to the attorney's
fitness to practice law, not one dependent on whether the act involved was criminal, involved moral turpitude or was proscribed
by the disciplinary rules. 57
B.

Criminal Acts

The Code of Professional Responsibility is incorporated into
Pennsylvania's rules as grounds for discipline. Therefore, any consideration of the specific rule regarding attorneys convicted of
crimes must be supplemented by the understanding that "illegal
conduct involving moral turpitude" is still a viable force in the
rules and may be used as a "catch-all" standard on which to rely
in marginal situations in order to determine the need for immediate
suspension or the final degree of discipline to be imposed.
In jurisdictions where criminal acts of attorneys are judged for
purposes of discipline by their degree of moral turpitude, there
seems to be little question regarding specific crimes which are
either very serious or very minor. 58 It is in the marginal crimes
that indecision results due to the confusion caused by the use of
the term "moral turpitude" by both lay and professional members
of society, and, indeed, by changing notions of morality within a
given society. If the term is to be strictly construed by the courts,
then the legislature must necessarily label criminal acts with :the
degree of baseness and depravity involved, which would result in
the responsibility for the discipline of attorneys being taken out
of the realm of the profession. If it is to be loosely construed as
discretionary with the judicial branch, then judges will be exercising the discretion without any established guidelines, resulting in
an ad hoc legislative approach and an undesirable opportunity for
discrimination. The Clark committee went a great distance toward
arriving at a satisfactory resolution of this dilemma with the proposed "serious crime" standard,59 but perhaps Pennsylvania's rules
have satisfactorily resolved the problem with even greater effectiveness.
56. The author seems to concur by suggesting the substitution of a collective description rephrasing judicial definitions of "moral turpitude." He

suggested "conduct, whether criminal or not, that adversely reflects upon
his capacity, character, or competency as a professional person." Id. at 280.
See also Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses that Justify
Disbarment, 24 CAL. L. Rnv. 9, 24-25 (1936) (wherein the author suggests
as a substitute for "moral turpitude," "conduct unbecoming a lawyer and
a gentleman").

57. One rule may specifically proscribe a given act, but, more importantly, the subject activity must be considered in light of an interrelation
of all of the disciplinary rules and related authorities.

58. See Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses that
Justify Disbarment,24 CAL. L. REv. 9, nn. 32 (e.g. murder) & 33 (e.g. simple
assault) (1936).
59. See notes 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
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The moral turpitude standard is severely discredited because
its use results in "substantial litigation to determine whether a particular crime is one 'involving moral turpitude.'"60 The A.B.A.
takes the position that, "[i]ts use as a criterion in disciplinary en6
forcement may cause additional embarrassment to the profession," '
therefore the A.B.A. favors immediate suspension pending appeal
on conviction of serious crimes. Noting that the jurisdictions which
do provide for immediate suspension of convicted attorneys use the
moral turpitude standard, the A.B.A. declared, "We prefer to use
'serious crime' and to define it in our proposed rule."6 2 Section
two of the proposed rule defined that term as follows:
(2) The term "serious crime" means a felony or any specified lesser crime a necessary element of which, as determined by the statute defining such crime, reflects upon the
attorney's fitness. The lesser crimes to be specified in the
rule should include, for example, interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation,
fraud, willful failure to file an income tax return, deceit,
corruption, coercion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt
or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit a "serious
crime. "63

The proposed rule would allow immediate and automatic suspension of an attorney convicted of such a crime. The determination of whether the lesser crime reflects on the attorney's fitness
is to be made solely by reference to the statute defining the crime.
This approach is contrary to standard practice in California which
would allow a consideration of all surrounding circumstances."
(1)

The Pennsylvania System

Under the Pennsylvania rules a conviction is now required before any disciplinary action can be taken.65 On receipt of a record
of conviction, the court 'may enter an order immediately suspending
an attorney if the crime is punishable by at least one year in prison,
excluding Motor Vehicle Code violations.6 The court shall, however, refer the matter to the disciplinary board for the institution
60. CLARK COMMITTEE, Problem 22, at 122.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 128.
64.

Id. at 128-29; CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE § 1602 (West 1962).

See

also § IVB2, infra.
65. The rules consider a plea of guilty or nolo contendere sufficient to
satisfy the requirement for a conviction.
66. Id.

of a formal proceeding to determine the extent of the final discipline to be imposed, provided that a final disciplinary proceeding
will not be brought to hearing until all appeals from the conviction
are concluded. 67 The requirement of a conviction is an affirmative
declaration on an issue which has remained undecided throughout
the case history in Pennsylvania. The provision for immediate suspension is decidedly more equivocal, but the end result achieved
is highly desirable.
In 1883 the United States Supreme Court, in Ex parte Wall,65
outlined quite clearly the history of the requirement for a conviction prior to disbarment. The A.B.A. does not presently endorse
summary disbarment in any situation, nor does summary disbarment represent the current trend in the law. 69 The concern of both
the A.B.A. and the Pennsylvania rules is with automatic interim
suspension until the final extent of discipline can be determined. 70
However, the summary effect may be present in cases where, after
interim suspension, disbarment results, and Pennsylvania seems
clearly to rely on the Wall approach as it would relate to the initial
interim suspension. Wall distinguished the English and American
rules as they then existed. The English rule basically allowed for
summary disbarment for conviction of any felony or any misdemeanor evidencing a "want of integrity." This could not be affected by reversal or acquittal. In addition, if an attorney is found
to have done an act which would affect his character as an attorney,
he could be summarily disbarred without a prior conviction unless
the act was indictable and was fairly denied. 71 The American rule
followed the British rule except in the area where the criminal
act was not done in a professional capacity. In these cases the court
recognized a diversity of approach with some jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, requiring a regular indictment and conviction
prior to disbarment 72 and others deeming the prior conviction unnecessary.7 3 The Court did not settle the problem, however, declaring, "It seems to us that the circumstances of the case, and not
any iron rule on the subject, must determine whether, and when,
it is proper to dispense with a preliminary conviction. '74 The Court
supported this proposition by reiterating that the constitutional
provisions requiring grand jury trials did not apply to disbarment
67. Id.
68. 107 U.S. 265 (1883).
69. Interview with F. LaMar Forshee.
70. CLARK CoNMITTEE, Problem 22, at 122-30; PA. SuP. CT. R. 17-14.
71. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 280 (1883).
72. Id. at 281-83, collecting cases from Arkansas, Missouri, New Jersey,
Ohio, Pennsylvania and Virginia. See also Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. 220
(1880).
73. Id. at 283-87, collecting cases from District of Columbia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York and Tennessee.
74. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 287 (1883).
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proceedings which are civil in nature and are not for the purpose
of punishment.76
The Wail decision ended Pennsylvania's firm stance requiring
prior convictions and resulted in differing interpretations of that
opinion. 7 6 With the adoption of the rules, a prior conviction is

definitely required for interim suspension, and no disciplinary hear7

ing may proceed to finality until all appeals are concluded.1

When analyzing the provision in the rules giving the court dis-

cretion to order an immediate suspension of an attorney convicted
of a crime, 78 there are two interrelated considerations: the severity
and the nature of the crime. The question of whether the crime
is severe enough to warrant disciplinary action is answered by the
rules which state that the statutory sentence imposed for any given
criminal act determines for the court whether the particular nature
of a crime renders it worthy of disciplinary action. 7
By using the
verb "may" rather than "shall" for the issuance of an order of immediate suspension where such a crime has been committed, the
role of discretion becomes apparent. Because the decision rests on
the discretion of the court, the seemingly clear statutory scheme

75. Id. at 288. But see note 28 supra.
76. In 1930 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged their
former position and decided that, "In the ordinary case, an attorney's name
will not be stricken from the rolls on account of an indictable offense until
it has been disposed of in the criminal court." Snyder's Case, 301 Pa. 276,
286, 152 A. 33, 36 (1930). Just three years later, the court noted that Wall
had changed the law, and that a prior conviction was no longer required
in all cases. Stone v. Bd. of Governance of the Pennsylvania Bar, 312 Pa.
576, 578, 168 A. 473 (1933); see also In re Chernoff, 344 Pa. 527, 26 A.2d 335
(1942). On the basis of the Wall decision and in recognition of the purpose
of a disciplinary proceeding, the court reasoned that, "Since the creation of
the Board of Governance, which is the instrumentality of the bar to discipline itself sanctioned and approved by us, the rule requiring prior convictions where the charge is criminal has no reason for existence." Stone v.
Bd. of Governance of the Pennsylvania Bar, 312 Pa. 576, 578, 168 A. 473
(1933).
The recognition that ordinarily a prior conviction would be required was not decisive, and the fact that a conviction would not be required in all cases left the issue unresolved.
77. PA. SuP. CT. R. 17-14.
78. Id.
79. Id.; This would include all felonies and misdemeanors of the first
or second degree. Misdemeanors of the third degree in Pennsylvania carry
a sentence of not more than one year, therefore one may have to look to
the definition of the specific crime to determine a specific sentence. If a
one year sentence is possible, misdemeanors of the third degree may be included. Summary offenses would not be included. Other crimes, without
specification of the class thereof, are considered at least misdemeanors of
the second degree, and therefore would be included. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 106(b), (c), (d) (1973).

of the rules becomes somewhat illusory.8 0
There are several possible bases upon which courts exercise this
discretion. The felony-misdemeanor split is totally unsatisfactory
because there are various classifications of crimes within these categories from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The nature of the crimes,
whether mala in se or mala prohibita, will not necessarily reflect
on an attorney's fitness to practice as a professional. The element
of crimen falsi8 l is an additional consideration for any test. Crimen
falsi is more closely related to the mala in se-mala prohibita dis2
tinction by evidencing a concern for the moral element involved.
s
Once the moral element becomes a concern "moral turpitude"
must be considered.
The policy in Pennsylvania has been one of truly open discretion. The court has said on this subject,
In Pennsylvania we have never adopted the so-called
"moral turpitude" rule. .

.

. No strict technical rule has

ever been adopted in this state. Our rule is one of common
sense and each case is judged on its own circumstances.
The true test in a disbarment proceeding is whether the
attorney's character, as shown by his conduct, makes him
unfit to practice law 8from
the standpoint of protecting the
4
public and the courts.
The problem inherent in ad hoc applications of judicial discretion
is that the discretion can rarely maintain certainty over long periods of time when the ones responsible for exercising that discretion
comprise an ever-changing group.
Marginal criminal acts which have been held to warrant severe
disciplinary action in Pennsylvania fall within three categories.
Those acts primarily affecting the administration of justice have
included unethical conduct not technically illegal,85 attempting to
80. Various jurisdictions have used several tests to determine the severity of the crime and the need for disciplinary action. Pennsylvania had
never adopted any particular test as a rigid standard prior to adoption of
the rules. See note 84 and accompanying text infra.
81. Crimen falsi, originally used at Pennsylvania common law to apply to crimes which would disqualify a witness, refers to acts involving
falsehood or those acts with a tendency to injuriously affect the administration of justice by the introduction of an element of falsehood or fraud. The
term is not strictly related to the felony-misdemeanor split because some
misdemeanors clearly involve fraud and falsehood. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Schambers, 110 Pa. Super. 61, 167 A. 645 (1933).
82. Id.
83. The term is inherently unsatisfactory, and completely impractical
as a sole standard for discipline. See notes 55-63 and accompanying text
supra.
84. In re Alker, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 653, 661 (O.C. Phila. Cty. 1959), aff'd
per curiam 398 Pa. 188, 157 A.2d 749, 752 (1960). This particular standard
is still being quoted by the board in judging the acts of the attorney. See
§V (B) supra.
85. In re Rosenbaum, 300 Pa. 465, 150 A. 748 (1930).
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make opposing counsel drunk,86 criminal libel against a judge, 87 and
suborning perjury.88 Criminal acts arising out of the professional
relationship of an attorney with his client include withholding a
client's money after demand 89 and inducement into a fraudulent
investment scheme. 0 Nonprofessional criminal acts for which
discipline has been imposed include receiving stolen goods, 91 obstructing recruitment and enlistment during wartime,92 fradulently obtaining passports,93 larceny, 94 solicitation, bribery and extortion, 99 and evasion of income tax.98 The courts have found difficulty in the past, however, with the need to consider the circumstances surrounding the commission of the criminal act. The question most often raised is the effect of acquittal. 9T Other considerations include a concern for whether or not the act is indictable,"8
a subsequent grant of pardon, 99 the past history and age of the
attorney, 100 and settlement reached on civil aspects of the case. l 0 l
These considerations generally create a tendency toward leniency
and no definite test had emerged from the decisions prior to the
adoption of the rules.
Working without clear statutory guidance for imposing discipline, the courts have had to determine for themselves the elements
of a criminal act which made it serious enough to warrant disciplinary action. The courts were in the unfortunate situation of
having to defeine a moral turpitude type standard without being
able to rely on a set definition of that term. Taken together, the
86. Dickin's Case, 67 Pa. 169, 5 A.R. 420 (1870).
87. Snyder's Case, 301 Pa. 276, 152 A. 33 (1930); Ex parte Steinman,
95 Pa. 220 (1880).
88. Stone v. Bd. of Governance of the Pennsylvania Bar, 312 Pa. 576,
168 A. 473 (1933); In re Barach, 279 Pa. 89, 123 A. 727 (1924).
89. In re Davies, 93 Pa. 116 (1880).
90. In re Alexander, 321 Pa. 125, 184 A. 77 (1936); Moyerman's Case,
312 Pa. 555, 167 A. 579 (1933).
91. In re Wolfe's Disbarment, 288 Pa. 331, 135 A. 732 (1927).
92. In re Margolis, 269 Pa. 206, 112 A. 478 (1921).
93. In re Griffin, 371 Pa. 646, 92 A.2d 889 (1952).
94. Stone v. Bd. of Governance of the Pennsylvania Bar, 312 Pa. 576,
168 A. 473 (1933).
95. In re Chernoff, 344 Pa. 527, 26 A.2d 335 (1942).
96. In re Brodstein, 408 Pa. 84, 182 A.2d 181 (1962); In re Alker, 16
Pa. D. & C.2d 653 (O.C. Phila. Cty. 1959), af'd per curiam 398 Pa. 188, 157

A.2d 749 (1960).

See § IV supra.

97. In re Alker, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 653 (O.C. Phila. Cty. 1959) affd per
curiam 398 Pa. 188, 157 A.2d 749 (1960); In re Chernoff, 344 Pa. 527, 26 A.2d
335 (1942); In re Wolfe's Disbarment, 288 Pa. 331, 135 A. 732 (1927); In re
Margolis, 269 Pa. 206, 112 A. 478 (1921).
98. In re Wolfe's Disbarment, 288 Pa. 331, 135 A. 732 (1927).
99. Id.
100. In re Rosenbaum, 300 Pa. 465, 150 A. 748 (1930).

101. In re Davies, 93 Pa. 116 (1880).

various elements relied on by the courts
sound curiously like a
10 2
sweeping definition of "moral turpitude.'
The rules have added a degree of certainty to the area of marginal attorney crimes while allowing for the controlled exercise of
judicial discretion to avoid inequitable results. 10 3 In fulfilling its
discretionary function the court must view the act in light of some
standard of fitness to practice law. The court is apparently willing
to rely on a determination by a legislative body that some crimes
are more serious than others and deserve higher penal sentences.
The court is not quite willing to completely relinquish authority
in the professional disciplinary proceeding based solely on that
same penal sentence. They are willing to review every case when
such a crime has been committed and an attorney is convicted, but
they seem intent on protecting the right of the legal profession to
finally judge itself.
This preservation of authority to judge attorney crimes is a
valid posture for the court to assume for two reasons. The first
is that at the same time the court is considering interim suspension,
the record of conviction is automatically turned over to the board
for the sole determination of the extent of the final discipline to
be recommended. This provision anticipates some degree of ultimate disciplinary action. The second reason concerns the court's
determination on immediate interim suspension. Under the rules,
the record of conviction is conclusive of guilt, 10 4 therefore it will
be given significant weight. The court is justified, however, in determining the relation of any such crime to the attorney's fitness
to practice, because as grounds for discipline the court has retained
the broad considerations of the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility. The provisions of DRI-10210 5 take into consideration the
morality factor, the various elements of fraud, the concern for the
proper administration of justice, and specifically the question of fitness to practice law.10 6 Hopefully the result will be to shift the
102. The courts concerned themselves with questions of whether the act
was dishonest, In re Griffen, 371 Pa. 646, 92 A.2d 889 (1952); unethical, Id.;
fraudulent, In re Brodstein, 408 Pa. 84, 182 A.2d 181 (1962); In re Alker,
16 Pa. D. & C.2d 653 (O.C. Phila. Cty. 1959) aff'd per curiam 398 Pa. 188,
157 A.2d 749 (1960); In re Griffen, 371 Pa. 646, 92 A.2d 889 (1952); In re
Alexander, 321 Pa. 125, 184 A. 77 (1936); Moyerman's Case, 312 Pa. 555, 167
A. 579 (1933); gross or infamous, In re Rosenbaum, 300 Pa. 465, 150 A. 748
(1930); representing a lack of moral perception, In re Griffen, 371 Pa. 646,
92 A.2d 889 (1952); evidencing the violation of an official oath, In re Barach,
279 Pa. 89, 123 A. 727 (1924); an obstruction of the administration of justice,
Snyder's Case, 301 Pa. 276, 152 A. 33 (1930); Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. 220
(1880); Dicken's Case, 67 Pa. 169 (1870); or a disregard of the obligation
to obey the law, Moyerman's Case, 312 Pa. 555, 167 A. 579 (1933).
103. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
104. The rules require, however, that all appeals have been heard and
concluded, PA. SuP. CT. R. 17-14.
105. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
106. Id.
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emphasis away from these elements as primary considerations in
the initiation of disciplinary action and to consider them only in
mitigation of the degree of discipline imposed. Ideally, the court
will consider a record of conviction of any crime with a possible
one year sentence to be a conclusive indication that immediate suspension should be ordered, unless the circumstances clearly do not
reflect on the attorney's fitness. The chairman of the board is fully
satisfied that the court is exercising its discretion by considering
three primary factors reflecting on an attorney's fitness: (1) protection of the public, (2) the integrity of the bar, and (3) the relative hardship to the attorney. 10 7 The general recommendation of
the board on conviction of such a crime will be for immediate interim suspension "when the public interest is threatened."' 0 8
(2)

The California System

In California conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude constitutes a cause for disbarment or suspension. 0 9
As in Pennsylvania a record of conviction is conclusive of guilt and
is forwarded to the supreme court through the State Bar of California, acting in a capacity similar to the 'Disciplinary Board of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 110 There is a provision for immediate suspension, and another establishing some guidelines for
the degree of discipline to be imposed after final judgment on the
conviction."' All of these considerations are permeated by references to "moral turpitude" as a standard."12 Although the use of
107. Interview with Gilbert Nurick. Mr. Nurick, who was also chairman of the Special Committee on Disciplinary Procedures of the Board of
Governance of the Pennsylvania Bar (see notes 18-19, 24 and accompanying
text supra), initially opposed the substitution of the discretionary element
for the automatic suspension provision for conviction of a serious crime.
108. Interview with Allen B. Zerfoss.
109. CAL.Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6101, 6102, 6106 (West 1962).
110. Id. § 6101.
111. Id. § 6102.
112. For example, a crime must involve moral turpitude before a conviction is grounds for disbarment or suspension, id. § 6101; the record of
conviction is forwarded to the supreme court only if the crime involves,
or "appear[s] from the record of conviction probably to involve, moral turpitude," id.; immediate suspension will follow only from conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, id. § 6102; the factors determining degree
of final discipline are considered only if moral turpitude has been shown,
id.; and any act, whether criminal or not, whether committed in a profes-

sional capacity or not, and whether, if criminal, a misdemeanor or felony,
constitutes a cause for disbarment or suspension if moral turpitude is involved; and, if the act is criminal, conviction thereof in a criminal proceeding is not a condition precedent to disciplinary action, id. § 6106.

the vague moral turpitude standard may seem to result in a lack
of certainty, the final results of the California system are almost
identical with the results achieved under the Pennsylvania approach, with the possible exception of certain marginal attorney
113
crimes.
The use of the moral turpitude standard in judging the nature
of an attorney's act in relation to his fitness to practice law will
now be examined. The California courts have specifically declined
to "confine with narrower limits the definition of what constitutes
moral turpitude,"' "14 and instead affirm "that the phrase itself has,
without the aid of specific definition, a sufficiently clear meaning
to enable [them] to determine whether the offense . . . comes
within it." 115 The courts have generally exercised their discretion
in a predictable manner since there are those crimes which clearly
involve moral turpitude,'" and those which do not." 7 In the
middle ground, however, the results under the moral turpitude
standard seem highly arbitrary. 118 There is strong indication of
a need for some better standard which would still retain flexibility
without bordering on meaninglessness. The courts acknowledge
113. That this difference is significant will be illustrated in the comparison with Pennsylvanias' rules and the discussion of evasion of income tax
which are covered in Section IV.
114. Jacobs v. State Bar of California, 219 Cal. 59, 64, 25 P.2d 401, 403
(1933).
115. In re Shepard, 35 Cal. App. 492, 494, 170 P. 422, 443 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App., 2d Dist. 1917). The courts seem willing to rely on broad law dictionary definitions . The Supreme Court of California refers most often to
,Bouvier's definition found in 2 Bouvma's LAW DIcTONARY 2247 (8th ed. rev.
1914). See, e.g., In re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147, 73 P.2d 885 (1937); Jacobs v.
State Bar of California, 219 Cal. 59, 25 P.2d 401 (1933); Dudney v. State
Bar of California, 214 Cal. 238, 4 P.2d 770 (1931); Marsh v. State Bar of California, 210 Cal. 303, 291 P. 583 (1930); In re Humphrey, 174 Cal. 290, 163
P. 60 (1917); In re Disbarment of Coffey, 123 Cal. 522, 56 P. 448 (1899).
116. See, e.g., In re Plodner, 5 Cal. 3d 714, 488 P.2d 385, 97 Cal. Rptr.
193 (1971) (receiving stolen property and supplying or administering an
abortion); In re Smith, 67 Cal. 2d 460, 432 P.2d 231, 62 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1967)
(grand theft, forgery, misuse of trust funds); In re Alkon, 64 Cal. 2d 838,
415 P.2d 800, 51 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1966) (manslaughter); In re Humphrey, 17
Cal. 290, 163 P. 60 (1917) (circulated cards challenging person and decisions
of judge); note 58 supra.
117. See, e.g., In re Richardson, 15 Cal. 2d 536, 102 P.2d 1076 (1940) (using U.S. mails to defraud); note 58 supra.
118. The California Supreme Court recognized "a field of doubtful cases
where the determination as to whether moral turpitude was involved may
fall on one or the other side of the line, depending upon the circumstances
of the particular case," In re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147, 150, 73 P.2d 885, 886
(1937), and that matters extraneous to the record of conviction are only material to the question of moral turpitude "if the record be doubtful on that
question and to resolve the doubt an investigation either by the courts or
the State Bar would appear to be necessary." In re Richardson, 15 Cal. 2d
536, 541, 102 P.2d 1076, 1078 (1940). The court reached the conclusion that
in such a situation the true test, even if the attorney is guilty, is whether
his moral character is so affected as to injure his reputation, or that of the
bar, in the performance of his professional duties. In re Rothrock, 16 Cal.
2d 449, 455, 106 P.2d 907, 910 (1940).
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their function in this area, but refuse to call for clarity in their
standards. 19
The ultimate concern of the court should be with an attorney's
fitness to practice law. Under California's procedure the court is
forced to make a determination in the first instance as to the nature
of a given criminal act. The most commonly considered element
which reflects on an attorney's fitness is fraud, both in the sense
of realizing an unlawful gain 120 and in the sense of breach of a
fiduciary duty. 12 1 The decisions have not been consistent, however,
in determining that fraud is an essential element of crimes in this
marginal area. 122 Where the crime may involve fraud, however,
the court at least is looking for some specific element to define the
nature of the crime. Where no fraud is involved in a crime, and
involves
the statute does not indicate that the crime on its face
123
moral turpitude, the determination is solely discretionary.
Under Pennsylvania's rules the nature of a criminal act is pre119. See notes 114-15 and accompanying text supra.
120. See, e.g., In re Langford, 64 Cal. 2d 495, 495-96, 413 P.2d 437, 441,
50 Cal. Rptr. 661, 664-65 (1966); In re Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 248, 272 P.2d
768, 771 (1954) (collecting cases involving petty theft, attempted bribe and
grand theft, forgery, grand theft, conspiracy to violate the General Cemetery Act by misrepresenting cemetery lots offered for sale, attempted extortion, misappropriation of a client's funds and knowingly receiving property
stolen from the mails).
121. See, e.g., Marsh v. State Bar of California, 210 Cal. 303, 307, 291
P. 583, 584 (1930).
122. Criminal acts involving elements of fraud or dishonesty held to
warrant discipline include conversion, Benson v. State Bar of California, 5
Cal. 3d 382, 486 P.2d 1230, 96 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1971); violations of the Corporate Securities Act, In re Langford, 64 Cal. 2d 489, 413 P.2d 437, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 661 (1966); In re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147, 37 P.2d 885 (1937); misuse
of trust funds, In re Smith, 67 Cal. 2d 460, 432 P.2d 231, 62 Cal. Rptr. 615
(1967); suborning perjury, In re Jones, 5 Cal. 3d 390, 487 P.2d 1016, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 615 (1967); and a general breach of fiduciary duty, Marsh v. State
Bar of California, 210 Cal. 303, 291 P. 583 (1930).
Other such crimes for which no element of fraud warranting disciplinary action was found include use of the United States mail to defraud, In
re Richardson, 15 Cal. 2d 536, 102 P.2d 1076 (1940); and fraudulent evasion
of income tax, In re Fahey, 8 Cal. 3d 842, 505 P.2d 1369, 106 Cal. Rptr. 313
(1973); In re Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 (1954); with no determination reached for "ambulance chasing," Dudney v. State Board of California, 214 Cal. 238, 4 P.2d 770 (1931).
123. In re Rothrock, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940), presents an excellent analysis of the moral turpitude standard as applied in a given marginal crime situation not involving fraud. The court was there considering
for the first time whether moral turpitude was involved in assault with a
deadly weapon. After considering all the factors which could have a bearing on their determination, including the fact that a light sentence had been
imposed at the criminal trial, the court concluded that no moral turpitude
was indicated, and no disciplinary action was taken.

determined by legislative fiat. The court is forced to review all
attorney convictions where the possible sentence is one year or
more. This difference is important, for the moral and ethical considerations imposed under the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility come into play only after disciplinary proceedings have been
initiated. Taking into consideration the question of fitness, the
court can decide not to order immediate interim suspension where
it may not be warranted. The record of conviction is already in
the hands of the board at that time to determine the final extent
of discipline. It seems unlikely that an attorney convicted of such
a crime would escape severe disciplinary action altogether. 24 By
establishing a rigid standard for initial consideration by the court
and the board, but leaving flexibility in the standards for mitigation, the role of judicial discretion is genuinely controlled without
taking the authority for discipline out of the hands of the profession. It is submitted that this distinction from the moral turpitude
standard does make a difference in the overall effectiveness of the
system for disciplinary enforcement where marginal attorney
crimes are involved.
V.

EVASION OF INCOME TAx-CONVICTION ON PLEA

OF NOLO CONTENDERE

The Clark committee concluded that,
No single facet of disciplinary enforcement is more to
blame for any lack of public confidence in the integrity of
the bar than the policy that permits a convicted attorney to
continue to practice while apparently enjoying immunity
from discipline. 125
A.

Plea Bargainingand the Nature of the Act

There seem to be two readily apparent reasons for the existence
of a policy which would allow an attorney convicted of evasion
of income tax 126 to escape disciplinary action. The first is the general preferential treatment given by law enforcement authorities
and courts to attorneys convicted of crimes.1 2 7 The second is the
124. To use assault with a deadly weapon as an example, which is
classed as a misdemeanor of the first degree in Pennsylvania, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 2702 (1973), and therefore carries a maximum sentence of

five years, the elements relating to fitness would be used only in mitigation
of what ordinarily would be an act clearly warranting severe final disciplinary action, if not immediate suspension. Id. § 106(b) (6). See note 123
supra.
125. Using as an example an attorney who had served eighteen months
for an income tax conviction, the chairman of a state bar disciplinary
agency testified to the committee that "it is the most difficult situation to

explain to the lay public."

CLARK COMMITTEE,

Problem 22, at 124-25.

126. Throughout the Comment a distinction will be made between a
willful failure to file income tax returns and a willful evasion of income
tax. See note 134 and accompanying text infra.
127. This consideration was recognized as a specific problem in the field
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nature of the criminal act itself as it relates to an attorney's fitness
to practice law.
The concern of the public arises out of a situation where an
attorney is charged with a crime and newspaper publicity attracts
attention to the act. While it is true that disciplinary agencies will
generally wait for a conviction to proceed, public attention is
aroused at the occurrence of the crime, and the conviction years
later may be for a lesser crime as a result of plea bargaining. This
discipline in the eyes of the public and
result indicates inadequate
128
perhaps even the bar.
The preferential treatment of attorneys arises out of successful
playing of one forum against the other. The attorney argues to
the sentencing court that his license is in jeopardy and to the disciplinary agency that he "has already been tainted with the stigma
of criminal conviction.' 29 The persons primarily responsible for
the unsatisfactory result are unwary prosecutors who perhaps do
not realize that although the circumstances surrounding an attorney's criminal misconduct can be used as a basis for discipline, the
conviction alone is generally the only conclusive proof of misconduct. Therefore acceptance of a plea to a lesser crime severely complicates the task of disciplinary enforcement. 13 0 The Clark committee recommended the adoption of a practice utilized in New York
City. The practice there is to allow no plea to a lesser crime and
no consideration of subsequent liability for disciplinary action at
unless the attorney tenders his resignation
the time of sentencing
3
from the bar.' '
The plea of nolo contendere leads to many of the same problems
which arise as a result of plea bargaining. The plea of nolo is generally accepted as an admission of guilt for the proceeding in progress, but is given no weight in subsequent civil actions. 13 2 The efof disciplinary enforcement by the Clark committee. Id., Problem 34, at
179.

128. The concern of the A.B.A. is not new, however, for an earlier com-

mentator on this same situation summarized the obvious viewpoint of an
educated public by noting that, "The bar sometimes seems less concerned
with keeping its house clean than with the pretense that it is clean." Com-

ment, The Imposition of DisciplinaryMeasures for the Misconduct of Attor-

neys, 52 COLIJM. L. REV. 1039, 1050-51 (1952).
129. CLARK COMMITTEE, Problem 34, at 180.
130. Id. at 180-81.
131. Id. at 181.
132. For an excellent, but impassioned, consideration of the effect of a
plea of nolo contendere where there has not been a conviction, see the dissent of Justice Musmanno, In re Brodstein, 408 Pa. 84, 88, 182 A.2d 181, 182
(1962).

fect of this plea is to force a disciplinary agency to wait for a conviction or to prove guilt by their own means if action may be taken
prior to a conviction. Automatic suspension provisions, like those
used in Pennsylvania's rules, now require a record of conviction
which is conclusive of guilt regardless of the plea.18 8 An argument
normally raised by attorneys entering nolo pleas is that guilt is
not necessarily shown by a conviction on a plea of nolo.
A critical concern in this area of disciplinary enforcement is
the distinction between the degrees of severity of the acts and the
nature of those acts under the federal statutes regulating income
tax evasion and willful failure to file.8 4 The question faced by
courts is whether conviction of an attorney under any of these statutes reflects upon his fitness to practice law.
Under the moral turpitude standard, California courts have
been primarily concerned with determining whether fraud is an essential element of the crime of income tax evasion.
61

35

Two Cali-

1

fornia cases, In re Hallinan 1and In re Fahey, " leave little doubt
as to the nature of the crime as considered in that jurisdiction.
Hallinan involved an attorney who had been given an eighteen
month sentence on conviction of "willfully and knowingly filing
false and fraudulent income tax returns."" 8 After laboring with
the usual attacks against the moral turpitude standard, the court
concluded that a crime in which an intent to defraud is an essential
element or a crime involving intentional dishonesty for purposes
of personal gain are both crimes involving moral turpitude. 1 9 The
133. PA. SuP. CT. R. 17-14; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6101 (1962).
Whereas a plea of guilty might be considered as equivalent to a conviction
(CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6101), a plea of nolo contendere will generally
require a conviction before it will be treated as equivalent to a plea of
guilty, and disciplinary action should not proceed to finality on a plea of
nolo contendere without a conviction. Interview with F. LaMar Forshee.
134. The three present statutory provisions regarding evasion of federal
income tax are found at 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201-03 (1954). Subject to a five year/
$10,000 fine are willful attempts to evade income tax in any manner and
willful failure to collect or pay over income tax. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7202
(1954). The willful failure to file a return, supply required information,
or pay income tax is subject to a one year/$10,000 fine. Id. § 7203. Some
of the cited cases considering the nature of these crimes were decided prior
to the effective date of the current sections. Similar provisions were found
at, and are referred to in those cases as, 26 U.S.C. § 145 (1939). See note
141 infra.
135. See notes 120-122 and accompanying text supra.
136. 43 Cal. 2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 (1954).
137. 8 Cal. 3d 842, 505 P.2d 1369, 106 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1973).
138. In re Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 (1954). Although not
directly at issue in the case, it is interesting to note that in 1954 a plea of
nolo contendere, even with conviction, did not provide a conclusive determination of guilt in California. Id. at 246, 272 P.2d at 771. The California
code now makes any conviction conclusive, but in the case of a nolo contendere plea, the plea itself is not conclusive without a conviction. CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6101 (1962). See also note 177 and accompanying text
infra.
139. In re Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 247-48, 272 P.2d 768, 771 (1954). See
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moral turpitude has to be reflected in the nature of the particular
crime, however, and "the record of conviction is 'conclusive evidence' only when the crime itself necessarily involves moral turpitude."'1 40 This determination of the nature of the crime is less drastic in its general effect because in this situation the court was considering the need for summary disbarment. Citing authority for
the fact that fraud was not an essential element of the crime
charged,' 41 the court concluded that the bad faith or evil intent
which was an essential element of the crime did not involve moral
turpitude, and that summary disbarment should not be ordered.
Rather, the court ordered an independent investigation to deter142
mine whether the attorney's conduct involved moral turpitude.
The second time before the court 48 Hallinan was suspended for
three years on the recommendation of the state bar. The finding,
after investigation, was that Hallinan had intentionally, and for the
purpose of personal gain, filed a false income tax return. 144 The
decision clearly establishes that in California fraud is not considered an essential element of income tax evasion. If moral turpitude is shown in the circumstances surrounding the commission of
the crime, however, disciplinary action is justified.
In re Fahey, 45 a 1973 decision, did not present the issue of summary disbarment. The amended California code now provides for
immediate suspension only, and therefore the decision more clearly
presents the issue in direct comparison to the Pennsylvania rules.
Fahey was convicted of willfully failing to file his federal income
tax returns and the court concluded that the offense and circumstances did not involve moral turpitude warranting disciplinary action. 46 The court collected cases1 47 showing the division in state
note 120 and accompanying text supra.
140. In re Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 249, 272 P.2d 768, 772 (1954).
141. The court noted that federal courts deciding California cases had
held that "an intent to defraud is not an essential element of section 145 (b)
(see note 134 supra) and that a conviction under that section does not necessarily involve moral turpitude." Id. at 250, 272 P.2d at 772. Then relying
on United States v.Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 521 (1931), the court concluded
that only where a statute makes the intent to defraud an essential element
would an indictment failing to aver that intent be defective. Id. at 250-51,
272 P.2d at 773. See also Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (consideration of "moral turpitude" in immigration proceeding).
142. In re Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 254, 272 P.2d 768, 774 (1954).
143. In re Hallinan, 48 Cal. 2d 52, 307 P.2d 1 (1957).
144. Id. at 54,, 307 P.2d at 2.
145. 8 Cal. 3d 842, 505 P.2d 1369, 106 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1973).
146. The A.B.A. had declared in a 1961 informal opinion that a willful
attempt to evade and defeat income tax is a crime involving moral turpitude. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. C-466

jurisdictions as to whether moral turpitude is involved in the crime
of failing to file income tax returns or whether discipline should
be imposed regardless of the existence of moral turpitude. 148 The
court referred to the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility as
the underlying basis for discipline where no moral turpitude is
found. Noting that general exhortations to observe the law and
uphold the honor and dignity of the profession had been included
only in the "aspirational" ethical considerations of the new code,
and not incorporated into the "mandatory" disciplinary rules, 49 the
court continued,
We agree with this treatment. Offenses that do not involve
moral turpitude or affect professional performance should
not be a basis for professional discipline simply because
they fall short of the highest standards of professional
ethics or may in some way impair the public image of the
profession. 1 0
The result of these two California decisions is that no moral turpitude is involved in the willful evasion of income tax or in the willful failure to file returns. Further, the circumstances surrounding
the commission of the crime will be examined only in the case of
a conviction for willful evasion, and, if moral turpitude is found,
discipline will be imposed on that independent and completely discretionary basis.
Two cases illustrate Pennsylvania's position on income tax evasion prior to the adoption of the new disciplinary rules. In In re
Alker, 5' an attorney was convicted of willfully and knowingly attempting to evade and defeat income tax. The court acknowledged
that some jurisdictions rely on the moral turpitude standard to determine the need for disciplinary action. Although the court dismissed the standard as "subject to varying interpretations,""12 it
went on to affirm that the weight of authority and better view
was that moral turpitude should be considered as only one element
(1961). The conclusion was that the attorney would be guilty of unethical
conduct under former Canons 29 and 32. Such conduct is now included not
only in the Ethical Considerations of the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility, but specifically in Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (3). See note 50
and accompanying text supra. See also notes 148-50 and accompanying text
infra. In addition, the other provisions of *DR1-102 are clearly broad
enough to include evasion of income tax under either of the criteria of the
elements of the crime or the attorney's fitness to practice law. See note
50 and accompanying text supra.
147. The cases collected and cited by the court in notes 7-10 are primarily from 59 A.L.R.2d 1398 (1958).
148. In re Fahey, 8 Cal. 3d 842, 852-53, 505 P.2d 1369, 1375-76, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 313, 319 (1973).
149. Id.
150. Id. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMIL.rrY, EC 1-5, 9-1, 96 (1970). But see note 50 and accompanying text supra.
151. 16 D. & C.2d 653 (O.C. Phila. Cty. 1959) aff'd per curiam, 398 Pa.
188, 157 A.2d 749 (1960).
152. Id.
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in a prosecution for filing fraudulent returns with the intent to
cheat the federal government of taxes.15 8 Relying on a "common
sense" standard of fitness to practice law, the court ordered disbarment. In In re Brodstein'5 the court ordered disbarment of an
attorney after a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of tax evasion
even though he had repaid the taxes. The decision was split but
the order of the court went almost without opinion. The main
questions in the dissent concerned the effect of the nolo contendere
plea and dissatisfaction with the summary disbarment which resulted without conviction. 155
B.

Pennsylvania'sRules

The standard for initiation of disciplinary action under the
rules is based upon whether the crime carries a sentence of one
year or more. The considerations of DRl-102 are also material in
Pennsylvania. The crimes of tax evasion and failure to file 15 6 all
carry a sentence of one year or more, therefore the court should
be forwarded a copy of the record of conviction and another copy
should be turned over to the board for determination of the extent
of final discipline to be imposed. According to the chief disciplinary counsel of the board, 15T there has not been enough experience
under the rules to categorize all crimes and penalties in such a way
as to predict the ultimate determination of the degree of discipline
with any certainty. The decision is all one of judgment, and the
only automatic discipline is disbarment on consent of the attorney
after resignation. 5 8 Once a qualifying crime is under consideration, therefore, considerations of moral turpitude and fitness are
relevant to determine the extent of discipline.
Two recent disciplinary orders have issued from the Pennsyl153. Id. See note 134 and accompanying text supra. For a general
treatment of Pennsylvania convictions not involving attorneys in a federal
court, see, e.g., Cirillo v. C.I.R., 314 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1963); United States
v. Gordon, 242 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1957); United States v. Pechenick, 236 F.2d
844 (3d Cir. 1956); United States v. Hoover, 233 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1956).
154. 408 Pa. 84, 182 A.2d 181 (1962).
155. Id. (Musmanno dissenting). See note 132 and accompanying text
supra.
156. See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
157. Interview with Allan B. Zerfoss.
158. See In re Anonymous, No. 12, 1974 Term (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary
Bd., Sept 5, 1974) (respondent chose to resign upon a conviction of income
tax evasion under 6 U.S.C. § 7201), as reported in The Disciplinary Board
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Summaries of Discipline Imposed
on Pennsylvania attorneys during the period July 1, 1974 through November
30, 1974, at 38.

vania Supreme Court without elaboration. 1 9 One case involved an
attorney convicted of willful evasion of income tax and the other
involved a conviction for willful failure to file income tax returns.
These are the first two cases involving income tax offenses in which
disciplinary action has resulted under the new disciplinary rules.
Although the court filed no opinions, the opinions of the board are
instructive for purposes of comparison with former case law in
Pennsylvania and with similar situations under the moral turpitude
standard of California.
In re Heilman' 60 was a suspension proceeding in which the
court adopted the recommendation of the board and suspended
Heilman for nine months after conviction of willful evasion of income tax upon a plea of nolo contendere. In the opinion filed by
the board it was regarded as settled in Pennsylvania that, "disbarment or suspension is the proper remedy for one who has been convicted, by plea or trial, of the charge of willful evasion of income
tax."16
'
While the degree of discipline imposed was less than the
disbarment that resulted in Alker and Brodstein, it does seem
settled that under the new rules the crime of willful evasion is severe enough to so adversely reflect on an attorney's fitness to practice law that suspension or disbarment will result. Less clear is
the result reached in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Fry.162 Fry
was convicted of willful failure to file and the recommendation of
the hearing committee was suspension for a period not to exceed
one year. The recommendation of the board was suspension for
a period of six months. Unfortunately, the court rejected the
recommendation without opinion and ordered a public censure in
a four to three split decision, the dissenters favoring adoption of
the board's recommendation for a six month suspension. In its
opinion the board noted that the principles applicable to a conviction for willful evasion were not determinative where the offense
was the less severe failure to file. The board nevertheless concluded that, even considering the extenuating and mitigating circumstances present in the Fry case, the willful and knowing nature
159. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Fry, No. 3, 1974 Term (Pa. Sup.
Ct. Disciplinary Bd., Nov. 4, 1974) (recommending suspension for six
months), disapproved, No. 70, Disciplinary Dkt. 3 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D., Dec.
9, 1974) (ordering public censure); In re Heilman, No. 23, 1973 Term (Pa.
Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., May 1, 1974) (recommending suspension for nine
months), approved, No. 364, Miscell. Dkt. (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D., May 17, 1973)
(order vacated July 16, 1974, substituting a similar order requiring a petition for reinstatement).
160. No. 23, 1973 Term (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., May 1, 1974)
(recommending suspension for nine months), approved, No. 364, Miscell.
Dkt. (Pa. Sup. Ct,, E.D., May 17, 1973) (order vacated July 16, 1974, substituting a similar order requiring a petition for reinstatement).
161. Id. at 5.
162. No. 3,.1974 Term (Pa. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., Nov. 4, 1974) (recommending suspension for six months), disapproved, No. 70, Disciplinary
Dkt. 3 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D., Dec. 9, 1974) (ordering public censure).
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of the act "casts a shadow of shame on our profession and mars
its integrity."1 63 The board specifically rejected the respondent's
reliance on the result achieved under the moral turpitude standard
in In re Fahey, and went on to state that the decisions in other
states involving the willful failure to file overwhelmingly support
the imposition of suspension or disbarment.164
It seems apparent that the court's leniency reflects an attempt
to draw a distinction between evasion and failure to file by imposing a lesser degree of discipline for the latter offense. This is probably a justifiable purpose, but the unfortunate dilemma was caused
not by the leniency in the Fry case, but by the imposition of a
lenient disciplinary order in Heilman. It is submitted that the
analysis of the board in the Fry case was accurate, and that suspension for six months was warranted by a conviction for failure
to file. Considering the precedent from Alker and Brodsten, however, where even the dissenters favored suspension for five years, 165
the result under the rules is unacceptable in the case of willful
evasion. The fault lies not with the disciplinary system, but with
the failure to confidently put the system into effect. Had the board
recommended disbarment or a lengthy suspension in Heilman, assuming that the court would have accepted the recommendation,
then the proposed recommendation in Fry would probably have
been adopted as a moderation for a less severe offense. Hopefully
the Heilman and Fry cases will not stand as precedent for such
lenient treatment in the future, and the strength of the system will
be allowed unbridled implementation when that strength is rerequired.

VI. DUE PROCESS

AND EQuAL PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS

The primary constitutional problems raised by disciplinary proceedings concern questions of notice, denial of opportunity to be
heard where summary procedures are in effect, and equal protec-tion for lawyers guilty of nonprofessional misconduct. The chief
disciplinary counsel of the board has asserted that these arguments
are continually submitted to challenge the authority of any disciplinary agency over the private professional.' 66 Most of these ques163.

Id. at 8.

164. The court collects cases and the degree of discipline imposed from
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon and
Washington. Id. at 10.
165. In re Brodstein, 408 Pa. 84, 182 A.2d 181 (1962)
senting).
166. Interview with Allen B. Zerfoss.

(Musmanno dis-

tions have been rendered moot in view of the multitude of cases
which have rejected these constitutional challenges.
In Pennsylvania, the right of a court to discipline attorneys as
its officers has long been blessed with constitutional approval. In
Ex parte Steinman and Hensel, the jurisdiction of the court to so
act in a proper case was qualified only by the need to afford the
attorney reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard in his
own defense. 167 Addressing itself to disbarment proceedings where
criminal acts were involved, the court ruled,
The office of an attorney is his property, and he cannot be
deprived of it unless by the judgment of his peers or the
we have been
law of the land, this last phrase meaning, as
taught by Lord Coke, "due process of law.""" 8
The Steinman case was specifically recognized by the United
States Supreme Court when deciding Wall. 6 9 Relying on the same
property concept used in Steinman, the Court concluded that while
the constitutional requirements for jury trials and indictments were
inapplicable in the civil disciplinary proceedings, some concern for
due process was necessary. The Court put to rest any serious concern it may have created for the moment, however, by resolving
that the power to remove an attorney "[was] a rightful one; and
when exercised in proper cases, [was] no violation of any constitutional provision. '170 Specifically, the court found no violation of
the fifth amendment because the action of a court in cases within
its jurisdiction was due process of law. 71
The most acute problem in the area of due process requirements
is summary discipline, particularly disbarment. Summary disbarment has apparently never been rejected as an unconstitutional
denial of due process. On the contrary, most early Pennsylvania
decisions on attorney crimes involved summary procedures. 172 Although the cases in which applicants were denied admission to various state bars because of alleged communist affiliations present
complex problems not directly relevant to the scope of this Comment, they are instructional in their treatment of due process considerations. 1 73 The Supreme Court held the states could not ex167. 95 Pa. 220, 237 (1880).
168. Id. In Pennsylvania the office of an attorney has generally been
considered to be a property right, requiring due process to deprive him of
that office. This proposition has been reaffirmed in Schlesinger Appeal, 404
Pa. 584, 596, 172 A.2d 835, 840 (1961). But see H. DRnKER, LEGAL ETmcs
35 (1965).
169. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 272 (1883).
170. Id. at 288.
171. Id. at 288-89.
172. See, e.g., In re Brodstein, 408 Pa. 84, 182 A.2d 181 (1962) (Musmanno dissenting).
173. See, e.g., In re Anastalpo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State
Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners of
New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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clude any person from the practice of law in contravention of the
due process or equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, but that a high standard of moral character reflecting a fitness to practice law was a permissible criterion for admission to,
or continuance in, the profession. 174 Nonetheless, the trend today
is against summary disbarment procedures. The automatic interim
suspension has the same practical effect in serious cases where disbarment is the ultimate discipline imposed, but it affords a much
clearer protection of an attorney's rights to full notice and hearing
opportunities before permanently depriving him of the right to
175
practice his profession.
The equal protection clause creates much more challenging
problems in the area of disciplinary enforcement. The two specific
areas of contention arise from allegedly arbitrary action among attorneys themselves, and from a double penalty against attorneys
as compared to lay offenders for the same crime. Arbitrary results
are inevitable because different types of disciplinary procedures use
different criteria to judge the nature of a criminal act and to determine the extent of discipline warranted under the circumstances.
In In re Hallinan76 the attorney alleged discrimination denying
him equal protection under the law. Other attorneys had been
charged or convicted for the same or similar tax law violations and
records of their convictions had not all been filed with the proper
disciplinary agency. Under the system then in effect, the court justified the treatment by differences in pleadings and circumstances
77
accounted for in the governing code.
The issue should not be resolved by a cursory reference to procedural justification if the result does indeed deny an attorney
equal protection. Such a reliance on procedural justification is only
valid if the procedure itself conforms to the constitutional mandate
of equal protection. The procedure must preserve not only the effectiveness of the disciplinary system but also must maintain as
many guarantees of fairness as possible. The Supreme Court has
addressed itself specifically to this issue in Cohen v. Hurley,
We do not hold that lawyers, because of their special status
in society, can therefore be deprived of constitutional rights
174. See, e.g., Schware v. 'Bd. of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S.
232, 238-39 (1957).
175. Notice and hearing considerations were discussed in relation to
other provisions of Pennsylvania's rules challenged on a constitutional basis
in a recent case. See note 23 supra.
176. 43 Cal. 2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 (1954).
177. Id. at 247, 272 P.2d at 771.

assured to others, but only, as in all cases of this kind, that
what procedures are fair, what state process is constitutionally due, what distinctions are consistent with the
right to equal protection, all depend upon the particular
178
situation presented ....
The Court proceeded to cite various specific fact situations involving occupations other than attorneys where distinctions were made
which did not deny equal protection. The Court made these factual
distinctions the determinative consideration for due process and
equal protection, concluding that, "[o]therwise making state procedures vary solely on the basis of the given occupation would indeed be nothing less than a denial of equal protection to barbers,
17 9
contractors, railroad employees, and government employees."'
The underlying theory for allowing the attorney to be subjected
to discipline as well as the sanctions of the criminal law can be
further justified by examining the practical considerations for such
double exposure. Two commentators have approached this issue
by focusing on the preventive nature of the disciplinary action, stating that "[t] he equal protection clause should not be deemed to
preclude special preventive treatment of lawyers who have engaged
in nonprofessional misconduct.' 8 0 Comparing an attorney and a
lay offender convicted of the same crime, the writers contend that
suspension of the attorney after both have completed the same sentence would seem to isolate the attorney from other criminals after
a supposed rehabilitation. Such a contention ignores the very nature of the legal profession. An attorney, if in fact not rehabilitated by the processes of the criminal law, may present a greater
social danger than other unreformed criminals. The writers conclude that, "the greater dangers would then justify continuation
of suspension to achieve 'greater preventive certainty.' )181
This is a sound analysis, and finds support in the procedures
developed in Pennsylvania's rules. The rules satisfactorily meet
the requirements demanded by the United States Constitution.
The rules contain extensive safeguards against a denial of due process.'8 2 The possibility of arbitrary action is greatly reduced by
clearly setting forth the nature of the crimes for which discipline
may be warranted. 88 In addition, the procedures established for
178. 366 U.s. 117, 129-30 (1961).
179. Id. at 131.
180. Schoen & Selinger, To Purify the Bar: A Constitutional Approach
to Non-ProfessionalMisconduct, 5 NAT. REs. J. 299, 327-28 (1965).
181. Id.
182. The rules outline the need for notice of charges and subsequent investigation, PA. SUP. CT. R. 17-8(a) (see also Rules and Procedures of the
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, codified by the
Legislative Reference Bureau in 3 PA. B. 2683-2704); ample opportunity for
explanation before the board makes a final determination, PA. SUP. CT. R.
17-8; formal hearings, id. 17-8(b); and review by both the board and the
supreme court, id. 17-8(c).
183. Id. 17-14. See note 79 supra.

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

reinstatement make clear that an attorney will be given every opportunity to demonstrate that "his resumption of the practice of
law within this Commonwealth will be neither detrimental to the
integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice
nor subversive of the public interest."'1 4 The fitness standard
exists to ensure the prevention of further harm to society, and an
attorney will be reinstated if preventive measures are deemed no
185
longer to be required in his particular case.
The rules seem to have been successful in eliminating possible
constitutional confrontations once cases are brought to completion
under the procedures established. By eliminating summary disbarment, specifically establishing the nature of crimes which may subject an attorney to discipline, fully outlining notice and hearing requirements, and providing for adequate reinstatement procedures,
the rules theoretically answered the areas of contention in the constitutional arena. Only time will prove an ultimate judge to the
practical application made of the procedures offered for use in this
vital area of attorney discipline.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The case law of Pennsylvania dearly indicates that the courts
of this state have been intent on determining the reflection of any
given criminal act on the attorney's fitness to practice law as a professional. Pennsylvania has been looking for the proper standard
for attorney discipline, but has never been afforded a proper framework within which the standard could be consistently applied. The
rules provide such a framework by drawing on the best elements
of the long-established moral turpitude standard of California and
the recent but considered recommendations of the A.B.A. Clark
committee. From the California procedure Pennsylvania has
adopted the need for a consideration of all the circumstances surrounding a crime in order to determine the effect of the act on
an attorney's fitness. From the A.B.A. proposal, Pennsylvania has
adopted the concern for a clear determination of the nature of a
particular criminal act which would warrant disciplinary action.
The result is flexible, but only in mitigation; clear, but not arbi184. PA. SuP. CT. R. 17-18(c).
185. Once a petition for reinstatement is properly submitted, the attorney is required to complete a questionnaire regarding his past practice,
grounds for discipline, compliance with all requirements during his period
of suspension of disbarment, and affording ample verification of character
and fitness to practice through references, employers, and proof of criminal
or civil restitution for the acts involved. 3 PA. B. 2694.

trary or rigid in its application; and, above all, completely devoted
to determining whether the criminal act does reflect adversely on
the attorney's fitness to practice law.
The one area which causes some concern for the future is the
inconsistent treatment of crimes generally from one jurisdiction to
another. The problem with a system of disciplinary enforcement
such as that established in Pennsylvania's rules is that it will not
produce consistent disciplinary results with those achieved under
other systems presently in effect in other jurisdictions. This is not
a patent problem with the rules themselves, but rather an unavoidable consequence of state control of discipline for attorneys. The
profession is in dire need of a uniformity in the treatment of attorneys convicted of crimes, and the standards of the profession
need to be determined with clarity. This would protect the public
as well as the bar. Pennsylvania has taken a step toward a unified
standard procedure by acting on the A.B.A. Clark committee recommendations. The recommendations are sound, and adoption of such
a procedure for disciplinary enforcement would guarantee the
degree of concern required in each and every jurisdiction for attorneys fit to practice their profession.

JACK HARTMAN

